# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
## WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505

**3 SEP 1982**

Mr. Steven Garfinkel
Director, Information Security
  Oversight Office (Z)
General Services Administration
18th & F Streets, N.W.
Washington, DC   20405

Dear Mr. Garfinkel:

Forwarded herewith is our Agency Information Security Program Data (SF 311) report covering the period 1 October 1981 through 31 July 1982.

As was done last year, the statistics on classification decisions in sections 7A-C of the report were obtained from an actual count over a seven-day period (17-23 July) and projected to cover the reporting period.

STAT

Sincerely,

Harry E. Fitzwater
Deputy Director
for
Administration

Enclosure

STAT DA/OIS/RMD/RSB/[     ]:kw   (30 August 1982)
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Continuation Sheet of SF 311

13. Narrative Report

   A. DECLASSIFICATION. Describe actions to declassify information under
   the systematic review procedures of the Order. Include discussion of
   problem areas and give estimated date for transition to systematic review
   as it reaches its 20th anniversary of origin.

The Classification Review Division (CRD) of the Office of Information
Services is responsible for the systematic review of Agency permanent records
over 20 years old. It is composed of officers from throughout the Agency
whose background and experience qualify them to make the necessary classification
judgments. Coordination with originating or responsible components is available
on those infrequent occasions when it is necessary. During the reporting period,
CRD production decreased by 8% due to a slight reduction in personnel and an
increase in other Agency review responsibilities. The review procedures CRD
negotiated with other agencies for three groups of interdepartmental records
have been used as a basis for further agreements on review of other interagency
material. CRD has also explored various methods of reviewing records stored in
non-paper form (film, microforms, ADP media, etc.). Shortage of qualified
personnel and limited secure vault and storage space for processing classified
material remain as problems.

   B. TRAINING. Describe all major actions relating to information security
   education and training, including special efforts toward limiting the
   amount, level, and duration of classified material generated, and increasing
   public access to information declassified.

During this reporting period, the Office of Training and Education enhanced
its program of instruction to familiarize Agency personnel at all grade levels
with the requirements of Executive Order 12065 and the Agency Information
Security Program Handbook. Our records management courses also address the
entire life cycle of records to include creation, use, maintenance, and
destruction of Agency records.

In addition, the Security Education Group (SEG) of the Office of Security (OS)
addresses a wide variety of audiences in performance of its mission. The
training provided by SEG includes security indoctrination for all new employees
and specifically tailored security reindoctrinations for members of particular
offices in every directorate. Regardless of the type of audience, the employees'
responsibility with respect to classified information is emphasized. In each
forum, the opportunity exists to raise questions about individual and
institutional responsibilities to properly classify, declassify and safeguard
national security information.

The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) has already accessioned some Agency records, and others are under consideration. NARS and the Presidential Libraries have been given printouts of a record group of finished intelligence from CRD's ADP system indicating the review decisions that were taken. Most of the material was declassified. This enabled NARS and Presidential Library personnel to take the indicated action on their own copies, thus making the information available to the public. In addition, we continue to periodically schedule teams of review officers to visit NARS and the Presidential Libraries to review material of CIA interest found in records of other agencies. Some of this material is declassified and becomes available to the public.

    C. SAFEGUARDS. Describe actions to enhance safeguards, to include control of reproduction, reduction of classified holdings, and improved methods of destruction.

The Physical Security Division of OS enforces the safeguards required by Executive Order 12065 and the implementing directives through a program of physical security surveys, inspections, and audits. There are approximately 750 separate elements which are subject to this program. These elements include Agency Headquarters components, domestic facilities, foreign facilities, and contractor facilities. This program is administered through the use of approximately 24 professional officers with appropriate supervision. The program centers around establishing physical security program standards and procedural standards and the enforcement of these standards through surveys, inspections, and audits.

    D. BALANCING TEST. Describe extent of use of the balancing test (E.O. 12065's, Section 3-303) and impact on Agency mission.

The balancing test, in the context of litigation to which this Agency is a party, imposes no significant burden.

    E. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT. Describe major problems encountered in implementing E.O. 12065 and ISOO directives.

The Agency's physical security program requires a substantial dedication of manpower. However, because of the nature of the Agency mission, the sensitivity of the information with which the Agency deals, and our charter to protect intelligence sources and methods, the implementation of Executive Order 12065 has not required a measure of physical protection over and above that already in existence.

Our most significant problem with implementation of E.O. 12065 continues to be the potential damage to the national security posed by the declassification and release of intelligence records, many of which by themselves may seem harmless but when considered in the aggregate could cause significant harm.